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NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 
Howard P. Kainz 
First, I want to discuss some terms. ''Natural rights" and "human rights" are closely 
related but not synonyms. Natural rights are connected with natural law theory and 
encompass human rights. If something is considered a natural right, it is also a 
human right. Not every proponent ofhuman rights subscribes to natural law theory, 
however. From this perspective, it is false to say that ifsomething is a human right, 
it is also a natural right. Although we expect a broad convergence of rights agreed 
on from both perspectives, divergences may occur. 
Also, "natural rights" should be distinguished from "~atural · law." The / 
confusions between thein are traditional and long-standing. Ius~n Latin can mean 
either "right" or "law." This ambiguity led the medieval jurists to make a 
distinction between objective ius and subjective ius (law and right). 1 Perhaps the 
sam~ ambiguity helped transform the historical emphasis from law to rights, 
without the change being noticeable. In German, das Recht has a similar double 
meaning, leading to hesitation among translators as to whether Hegel's Philosophie 
des Rechts should be translated as Philosophy ofRight or Philosophy ofLaw. The 
case is similar to le droit in French, el derecho in Spanish, and lo diritto in Italian. 
So we are faced with adeast one situation where Anglophones might claim that 
their language is more precise philosophically than other languages! 
But the ambiguities are not just semantic, they are also conceptual. Many 
philosophers associate "natural law" with "state of_nature" theories, which are 
primarily concerned ·with the elucidation .of basic rights. However, we should 
.remember that even classical theorists like Hobbes and Locke discuss natural law 
as well as natural right. 
. Natural law addresses fundamental moral duties, natural right (and rights) 
concern fundamental moral claims or entitlements. John Finnis in Natural Law and 
Natural Rights develops a precise legal definition: 
We may safely speak of rights wherever a basic principle or requirement of 
practical reasonableness, or a rule derived therefrom, gives to A, and to each 
and every other member of a class to which A belongs, the benefit of (i) a 
positive or negative requirement (obligation) imposed upon B (including, inter 
alia, any requirement not to interfere with A's activity or with A's enjoyment 
of some other form of good) or of (ii) the ability to bring it about that B is 
subject to such a requirement, or of (iii) the immunity from being himself 
subjected by B to any such requirement.2 . 
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~· Natural law and natural right are correlative; neither can exist without the other. 
In social relationships, the existence of a right implies a corresponding duty, and 
a strict duty in a social context implies that someone has a right. In philosophy, 
natural rights are connected with individuality and personhood. Natural law, 
however, is associated with sociality and communality - the proper relationship 
· between individuals, possibly in a top-down configuration, sometimes horizontally. 
Natural rights are implicit in a natural law theory, but explicit attention to 
natural rights has evolved slowly. One hears ofdubious and strained ascriptions of 
natural rights theory to Plato and Aristotle, but we should focus on the Stoics for 
definite statements about natural rights. The Stoic philosopher Epictetus writes, j 
"Even the slave is deserving our esteem and able to claim from us his rights"3 - a 
far-reaching insight coming froin the second century A.D. Aquinas, however, does 
not present a theory of rights in the modem sense. !us for Aquinas is Aristotelian./ 
justice, the virtuous maintenance of equitable relationships concerning property · 
among individuals. He says nothing about the right to political liberty or equality, 
or even to life or happiness. 
The modem notion of natural/human rights came into the limelight with the 
French Declaration ofthe Rights ofMan and the Citizen (1789), which asserted 
that liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression were the "imprescrip­
tible natural rights" of all human beings. They are "imprescriptible" because no 
political power or legislature could grant them or take them away. Earlier, 
American founders like Jefferson, working in the context of Lockean natural law 
theory, grappled with the problem of coordinating natural law with the rights of 
subjectivity. Spelling out these rights, the American Declaration ofIndependence 
(1776), thirteen years before the French Declaration, opens by emphasizing the 
basic rights of"life, liberty, and the pursuit ofhappiness." 
~ For us in the twenty-first century, the major impetus to a revival of interest in 
both natural law and natural rights was the Nuremberg trials in the aftermath of 
World War Il and the Holocaust in Nazi Germany. These trials brought to the fore 
·the question ofwhether there is any ~gher law to which we can.appeal when statist 
laws are corrupt or evil. (How can we even judge statist laws as evil, except in 
· terms of some higher standard oflaw?) Subsequently, a remarkable international 
consensus on basic human rights was achieved in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, promulgated by the United Nations, which gave member nations 
the hope ofpreventing any recurrence ofa holocaust. The rights listed in the 1948 
Declaration included rights to life, liberty, and security ofperson; equality before 
the law; privacy; marriage and protection offamily life; the ownership ofproperty; 
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; work; education; protection against 
unemployment; enjoyment of the arts; and many other rights in the legal, political, 
and cultural spheres. 
As we examine this extremely extensive list, the question naturally emerges as 
to whether consensus, even broad consensus, is enough to provide a justification. 
for these rights. If someone asks, "What are the grounds for the supposed right to 
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freedom of thought?" we should be able to offer a satisfactory philosophical 
grounding for this .alleged right. And do not some rights exist, say, the rights of 
women and children, which, even in lieu of a broad consensus, can be and should 
be justified and defended? 
Wh.en asked about the foundation ofnatural rights, our first response might be, 
"Well, of course, the basis for natural rights must be in human nature itself." But 
this respon$e will soon encounter the objection, "What do you mean by human 
nature?" Even if you could answer that objection satisfactorily, you would 
inevitably encounter the next objection, "You are guilty of the value/fact or 
'ought'/'is' fallacy." Natural rights are obviously values, and we cannot derive a 
value from a fact; but is not human nature something factual? The interdiction of 
this fallacy is supposedly traceable to Hume, although a number of works take 
issue with this widespread interpretation ofHume.4 But if, in our strenuous efforts 
to avoid all fallacies, we resolutely try to avoid deriving any moral values from 
human nature, we almost inevitably end up trying to excogitate basic values on the 
basis of pure reason, something that Hume, who traced moral values back to · 
"sentiments" grounded in human nature, roundly criticized. 
Hume writes: 
The Ultimate ends of human actions can never, in any case, be accounted for 
by reason, but recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections 
of mankind without any dependence .on the intellectual faculties ... Reason, 
being cool and disengaged, is no motive to action, and directs only the impulse 
received from appetite or inclination by showing us the means of attaining 
happiness or avoiding misery ... The standard of[reason], being founded on the 
nature of things, is eternal and inflexible, even by the will of the Supreme 
Being; the standard of [the sentiments], arising from the internal frame and 
constitution of animals, is ultimately derived from that Supreme Will which 
bestowed on each being its peculiar nature and arranged the several class~s and 
orders ofexistence. s 
The major contemporary theoretician ofnatural law and natural rights John Finnis, 
following the lead of the Thomist Germain Grisez, makes a clean break with 
Thomistic attempts - or what seem like Thomistic attempts - to derive natural law 
from human nature. His non-derivation is based on aset of seven self-evident basic 
values- knowledge, life (preservation oflife, possibly also the procreation oflife), 
play, aesthetic experience, sociability (friendship), practical reasonableness 
(applying one's intelligence to problems and situations), and religion and pursuit 
ofultimate questions about the cosmos and life- analyzed in the light of"practical 
reasonableness.''6 Ironically, Finnis, whose main purpose is to develop a natural 
law theory adhering strictly to Humean requirements, ends up ignoring the "natural 
sentiments" that Hume emphasized and relying on the sort ofpure rational analysis 
that Hume criticized. Finnis's analytical "baptism" ofAquinas's arguments has led 
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to an ongoing dispute between traditional Thomists like Henry Veatch and Ralph 
Mcinerny. 7 More recently, Anthony Lisska tried to mediate between the two camps 
by discerning analogues to human nature in the concept of "natural kinds," often 
used in contemporary analytic philosophy.8 
Natural rights that are not based on nature would be equivocal. Finnis indicated 
this in a fall 1997 colloquium in the Marquette University Law School. When 
asked who would be excluded as a natural law ethicist, he was unwilling to ·exclude 
any person who held a non-relativistic ethical theory. On further questioning, he 
included both Bentham and Kant as "natural law theorists"! He then admitted that 
only on the urging ofhis mentor, H.L.A. Hart, did he title his book Natural Law 
and Natural Rights. He refused to answer questions·about his preferred title for the 
book. We may surmise that Finnis, Grisez, and others share the search for 
objective, non-relativistic ethical principles with traditional natural law theorists. 
A key problem for some natural law theorists is .the Summa theologiae, 
1-11.94.2, where Aquinas seems to derive natural laws from the tripartite aspects 
ofhuman nature. He writes: 
The order of the precepts of the natural law exists according to the order of 
natural inclinations. Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good 
in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances: 
inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according 
to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of 
preserving human life, and ofwarding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural 
law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more 
specially. According to that nature which he has in common with other anim~ls: 
and in virtue of this inclination. those things are said to belong to the natural 
law, which nature has taught to all animals, such as sexual ·intercourse, 
education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to 
good, according to the n~ture ofhis reason, which nature is proper to him: thus 
man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in 
society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the 
natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among 
whom one has to live. and other such things regarding the above inclination.9 
Thus, Aquinas makes the distinction between three aspects of"nature" in human 
beings and the fundamental inclinations consequent upon each aspect. First, he 
argues that humans.are beings and, like all natural beings, are inclined to preserve 
themselves, to stay in being. Second, he says they are animals inclined to reproduce 
and rear their young. Third, their essence is distinctively and uniquely rational, so 
that they are naturally inclined to knowledge and social order. From these premises, 
Aquinas derives the fundamental natural laws of self-preservation, sexual 
responsibility and the duty to educate the young, and the duties to strive. for 
knowledge ofGod and maintain amicable relationships with fellow human beings. 
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Finnjs characterizes· these passages as simply a "meditation" on the relationship of 
. human life to three metaphysical levels - inorganic, organic, and mental. 1°Finnis 
argues that thjs could not be a deduction ofvalues, since values must be derived 
independently of facts, on the basis of their intrinsic self-evidence. 
I am suspicious that Finnis spends fourteen pages in Natural Law and Natural 
Rights arguing for the "self-evidence" ofknowledge, the first of the seven· "basic 
values," and twelve pages discussing the other six values. His long drawn-out and 
multifaceted arguments for the value ofknowledge are offered as a template for the 
rules ofself-evidence, which can be applied to the other values. But after reading 
these arguments, we think ofthe scholastic distinction between things that are self­
evident in se and things that are self-evident quoad nos. Surely the moral value of 
the third basic value, "play," is something that for trained philosophers is not self­
evident quoad nos, but at most self-evident in se. 
I suggest we take a second look at Aquinas's triple division discussed above. 
On closer examination of the controversial Question 94 ofthe Summa, we may find 
Aquinas's analysis is not really guilty ofderiving values from facts, and is not only 
the clearest exposition of basic natural "laws," but also ofbasic natural "rights." 
First it may be a little difficult to understand how an inclination to "self­
pres~rvation" can be predicated for beings that have no "self." Also, the 
Aristotelian theory that natural "appetites" are intrinsic to all beings - · stic_ks and 
stones, as well as plants and animals - may seem overly anthropomorphic. 
However, leaving some unstable elements ofphysics aside, we can generalize that 
natural kinds tend to stay in existence. It is almost self-evident that living beings, 
with all their built-in mechanisms for preserving themselves, tend to stay in being, 
even ifwe are anxious to avoid Aristotelian presuppositions about teleology. Thls 
tendency toward self-preservation is both a factµal drive and a value. Natural 
beings are constituted to preserve themselves, and this is intrinsically good and 
valuable. Regarding the second natural ~spect, sexuality, we may experience 
_culture-shock, living in an era full of symbols of a contraceptive mentality. 
However, even the contraceptive mentality underlines our acute awareness of the 
connection between sexuality and reproduction and our understanding that rearing 
human children is much more arduous and time-consuming than rearing animal 
offspring. The birth ofa human being does not just take place nine months after 
conception, but involves prolonged gestation by the family and the community, and 
immense amounts of education to supply for the comparative lack of instincts in 
humans. Again, we are faced with the drive to raise our offspring and the 
responsibility, spanning many years after birth, to further the material, intellectual, 
and spiritual.welfare ofour children. With the third natural aspect, rationality, we 
might balk at Aquinas's extrapolation of rationality to the quest for knowledge of 
God, but we can have no doubt that the human desire for knowledge has no built-in 
limits. Aquinas also associates rationality with sociality. This tendency ofdealing 
rationally with fellow human beings might be ~haracterized as the basis for the jus 
naturale, but the "facts" connected with rationality are not "just" facts. They 
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converge with the values of expanding knowledge and increasing communality._ 
The convergence is so close and clear in this· case that discussion of the 
"derivation" of the values from the facts misses the point, as ifsome neutral hiatus 
exists between facts and values. 
Second, in common parlance, we hear about the "law ofself-preservation," so 
existence of such a "law" is a truism. But the self-preservation of the individual is 
both a duty and a right, the right to life. Self-preservation implies, for example, the 
duty and right to maintain health and security, the duty and right to avoid 
euthanasia and assisted suicide; some people even speak of a duty and a right 
toward things like the primary or secondary inhalation of cigarette smoke. The 
dutiful implications of sexual reproduction are for us more problematic than the 
duties of self-preservation. As the global population reaches six billion, some 
people speak conversely about a solemn duty "not" to reproduce. Ifwe examin_e 
this position more closely, we find the real concern is that "poor" people stop 
reproducing. They cannot assure us that if poor people have fewer children, the 
ratio of poor people to rich people in the world will change for the better. We ask 
ourselves if the biblical injunction to "increase and multiply, and fill the earth" 
(Genesis I :28) has any meaning at this time. Have we not filled the earth? Not 
really. The world has plenty of room for everyone. One political scientist has 
calculated that if the population ofthe world lived in Texas, there would be a little 
over 1,300 square feet for each individual. If an "over-population" problem exists, 
it is not because of too little space. What we call "overpopulation" has to do with 
politics and the problems ofdistributing the world's resources. The natural "right" 
of the poor and the rich to reproduce must be recognized, with the understanding 
that the duty ofhaving offspring is limited, and, as Aquinas observed in regard to. 
the status of celibates, it is not a duty for everyone. However, we should not 
concentrate solely on the physical procreation of human beings, for whoin the 
"gestation period" goes well beyond nine months. Corollary with reproductive 
rights and duties are the right and the duty ofworking for a living wage to support 
our offspring. The most important rights and duties are to hurture and educate 
them, once we bring them into the world, a task many parents are unwilling to 
·entrust completely to the state or to a third party. Finally, in the third natural aspect, 
we see the clearest convergence of right and duty. Oui development of rational 
capacities and the pursuit ofknowledge and social concord are not only inalienable 
rights that we must constantly defend, but they are irrevocable duties that cannot 
be shirked without a loss of our humanity. · 
You will note that many of the rights listed in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights - the rights to life, security of person, marriage and protection. of 
family life, the ownership of property, work, education, protection against 
unemployment - are connected with the rights we have just discussed. But what 
about freedom? The Universal Declaration also mentions' 'liberty, freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religion. For the modem consciousness, these rights have 
a certain precedence and preeminence. Is there such a thing as a natural law or a 
25 Natural Law and Natural Rights 
natural right ofpursuing freedom? We should be aware that freedom in the modem 
sense does not appear in ancient and medieval philosophy. Explicit discussion of 
freedom in our sense is not found in the writings of classical natural law theorists. 
Yet freedom and the right to freedom is implicit in Aquinas. While he does not 
explicitly mention an inclination to freedom, in the Thomistic Aristotelian context, 
where the will is the "appetite" of the rational/intellectual faculty, an impetus 
toward freedom is implied. If the development of rationality is a right and a duty, 
then the acknowledgment and exercise of freedom is indispensable to rational 
living. This falls short ofJean-Paul Sartre's attempt to base all values on freedom 
and ofthe emphasis on freedom iri the Western world and in modernity in general. 
Here the · issue of the hierarchy of values becomes relevant. Reflection on the 
Thomistic hierarchy, which begins with the law/right of self-preservation, may be 
particularly timely for us. In ·our era of nuclear armament, as warheads are 
multiplied, as great nations like India and Pakistan force their way into the "nuclear 
club," and as potentially terrorist groups are enthusiastically acquiring "backpack" 
and ''suitcase" atomic bombs, we could argue the "law of self-preservation" has · 
become the chief and the most relevant natural law. The world now is faced with 
the pressing obligation ofeither eliminating its nuclear arsenals or facing imminent 
destrµction from an accidental or intentional triggering ofWorld War III. But this 
obligation of self-preservation is at the same time a right that must be claimed by 
the citizens of the world, despite government reluctance to change the "status quo" 
of"Mutually Assured Destruction." Ifa hierarchy ofvalues exists, life and survival 
may be even more important than freedom, since they are the sine qua non for the 
existence of freedom. John Finnis's mentor, the legal positivist, H.L.A. Hart, 
although no proponent of natural law, suggested that survival is "the central 
indisputable element which gives empirical good sense to the terminology of 
Natural Law." 11 This is an interesting convergence of legal positivism and natural 
law theory. 
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